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1. INTRODUCTION
The Higher Education Act of 1965 authorized the creation of the Pell Grant
that first provided financial aid in 1973. From its inception, Pell has been the
largest need-based grant program in the United States, allocating over $13 bil-
lion in assistance to roughly one-quarter of all U.S. undergraduates in 2006.
Despite the size of the Pell program, however, the effect of its available policy
instruments on postsecondary educational institutions is relatively unknown.
This article empirically examines whether changes in the generosity of the Pell
program affect the distribution of Pell revenues across the quality spectrum
of higher education institutions, which speaks to a primary interest of U.S.
financial aid policy to facilitate the match of students to institutions based on
ability. In particular, we analyze how generosity correlates with institutional
Pell revenues by utilizing exogenous variation in federally determined maxi-
mumPell Grant and federal appropriation levels, as well as annual variation in
the total number of students who are deemed Pell eligible following the appli-
cation of federally determined criteria. Broadly, Pell revenues depend on the
pool of students applying for aid and their institutional choices. Thus we also
explore how institutional Pell revenues relate to changes in the average Pell
award per student and enrollment at each institution, which provides some
of the first formal evidence of the Pell program’s efficacy in influencing the
composition and net distribution of needy students across U.S. universities.
Although a stated objective of the Pell program is to increase the accessibil-
ity of higher educational opportunities for low-income students, there is little
existing evidence that the Pell Grant has significantly affected the college-going
behavior of needy students. In particular, in response to the introduction of the
Pell program, enrollment effects in general populations of students are weak
(e.g., Hansen 1983; Kane 1994, 1995; Heller 1997; McPherson and Schapiro
1998). This is particularly noteworthy in light of other forms of aid found to
have significant enrollment effects (e.g., Bound and Turner 2002; Dynarski
2003). The lack of a clear and consistent enrollment effect generally suggests
that Pell aid might not be sufficient for the broad population of needy students
to surmount the enrollment hurdle.
On the other hand, there is evidence of Pell influencing more narrowly
defined groups of institutions or students. For example, Kane (1995) finds
that the Pell program increases overall enrollment at public two-year colleges,
which suggests that aggregate enrollment effects may vary with the selectivity
of the institution. However, Kane (1995) does not separate needy from non-
needy students. Similarly, Seftor and Turner (2002) exploit variation in the
Pell eligibility formula in the late 1980s that decreased the generosity of the
program for financially independent students to document decreased access
for nontraditional students.
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In the existing literature, student-level studies generally do not observe
whether a high school graduate receives a Pell grant or whether the student
even applies. Instead, they focus on low-income students who would poten-
tially qualify for the Pell award. On this note, while our analysis will remain at
the institutional level due to data limitations, we do build on prior work by fo-
cusing on the institutional outcomes of participating students. Overall, we find
significant increases in institutional Pell revenues with increased generosity.
For example, our estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in themaximum
Pell award is associated with a 16 percent increase in revenues received at the
average institution. Nonetheless, the magnitude (and even the direction) of
the revenue response depends on the channel (i.e., the maximum Pell value
versus federal Pell funds) and the selectivity of the institution. Thus, for exam-
ple, the revenue elasticity point estimate for the maximum Pell award is not
statistically different from one for two-year institutions, whereas this elasticity
is found to be nearly two for the least exclusive four-year institutions. Overall,
we show that changes in Pell generosity can yield significant distributional
effects in terms of both Pell revenue received and Pell students enrolled in
institutions of different selectivity.
From a political economy perspective, reporting the potential for differen-
tial gains across institutions in response to changes in Pell distribution rules
highlights the importance of understanding allocation mechanisms. In par-
ticular, our revenue data also show that the fraction of Pell revenues going to
two-year institutions rose from just over a quarter of the total disbursements in
1989 to over 40 percent in 2002, suggesting that Pell aid has expanded access
at less selective institutions.While institutionsmay not have direct preferences
about where their revenues arise—from Pell or non-Pell sources—the issue
clearly remains of social concern, given the distribution of federal expendi-
tures across institutions. Our empirical analysis examines whether changes
in policy instruments contribute to or mitigate the movement of funds for
needy students toward two-year degree programs and away from four-year
schools, which highlights the political economy factors that underlie federal
aid allocation mechanisms.
The aggregate nature of the data available on Pell enrollees implies
that one cannot separate the collective impact of student- and institutional-
level decisions on observed outcomes. Nonetheless, consistent with Pell
awards being made to individuals rather than institutions, we also find
evidence through dissecting institutional revenue into separate analyses
of Pell student enrollment and average award values reported at institu-
tions that revenue specifications alone do not reveal the true nature of the
underlying allocation of Pell funding across institutions. Thus our anal-
ysis offers additional support for the conjecture that individual student
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enrollments respond to aid net of potential institutional responses to the
program.
Our findings suggest that changes in Pell generosity may affect themargin
determining who among the needy apply for federal aid and where they enroll.
Thus, while institutional-level data keep us from making strict inferences
about the behavior of particular groups of students (i.e., needy students), the
ability to separate Pell enrollment patterns complements existing efforts to
document the efficacy of Pell. In particular, we follow the enrollment decisions
of low-income youth around the 1992 Higher Education Amendments (HEA)
that removed tuition-based caps on maximum Pell awards to identify how
exogenous granting practices affect institutional choice. Measured against a
group of slightly more expensive but otherwise similar institutions, we find
a 5.3 percent increase in the enrollment of low-income students at low-cost
institutions that experienced this exogenous increase in Pell generosity. In
short, results suggest that student enrollment does respond to aid.
After describing some of the mechanics of the federal Pell Grant program,
the following section of this article assesses the impact of changing federal aid
levels on institutional-level Pell revenues over the 1989–2002 period. Section
3 contains the dissection of institutional revenue into enrollment and award
value, offering estimates of the relative strength of these contributing factors.
In section 4, we separately test the efficacy of change to the Pell program
in the 1992 HEA using a subsample of relatively low-cost institutions. We
summarize the results in section 5 and offer some additional discussion and
concluding remarks regarding enrollment effects and average award values.
2. TOTAL INSTITUTIONAL PELL REVENUE AND VARIATION IN PELL
GENEROSITY
Data
Our primary data source is the Integrated Post-Secondary Education Data Sys-
tem (IPEDS), which provides detailed institutional data.Our sample consists of
IPEDS data for 1989–2002.Where related research has relied on indirectmea-
sures for the number of low-income students, such as minority enrollments
or other student background measures that are correlated with income (e.g.,
Kane 1994; Dynarski 2004), our analysis exploits unique institutional-level
Pell-related data from the Department of Education to directly examine the
effects of changes in the Pell Grant program on low-income students and the
associated revenues they bring to institutions. In particular, these data provide
information on the number of Pell recipients and revenues for each institution
for the 1989–2002 period. We supplement these data with information drawn
from the state-specific labor market and economic measures acquired from
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standard sources. In addition, we adopt Peterson’s Guide to Four-Year Colleges
(1990) as our metric for an institution’s selectivity in 1989, which allows us
to separate two-year institutions from four-year institutions classified as non-
competitive, minimally difficult, moderately difficult, very difficult, and most
difficult. To focus on a well-defined set of colleges with a common academic
mission, we restrict the sample to nonprofit institutions that offer at least an
associate’s degree, excluding for-profit and trade schools.1
Pell Generosity and Sample Selection
To receive federal aid, a studentmust first complete a Free Application for Fed-
eral Student Aid (FAFSA) form, which provides financial aid administrators
with the information needed to determine the size of an applicant’s Pell Grant.
The award value is formulaic, determined by the student’s expected family con-
tribution (EFC) and the institution-specific costs of attendance (COA) such as
tuition, room, board, and other expenses such as books and travel. For depen-
dent students, the EFC is a function of parental income and wealth and the
number of siblings in college. Conditional on being above the federally man-
dated minimum grant, the level of an individual student’s grant in any given
year is the minimum of (1) the difference between the federal maximum Pell
Grant and the student’s EFC; (2) the difference between the institution’s COA
and the student’s EFC; and (3) prior to 1993, 60 percent of the institution’s
COA.
There are three margins on which the federal government can effectively
change the generosity of the Pell program that we exploit in our empirical
analysis. First, in terms of measuring the influence of Pell generosity on in-
stitutional revenues, the maximum potential Pell award any student might
receive at institution i in year t ,MaxPellit, is arguably of most interest. Second,
given that we can also control for variation in the typical student-age popula-
tion, the number of Pell applicants deemed eligible based on family income,
Eligiblest , can also speak to the generosity of the Pell program. Finally, we
include federal appropriations for Pell grants, FedAppropt , in an attempt to
capture the intended generosity of the Pell program in aggregate. While not
1. Our sample period is restricted to 1989–2002 because IPEDS is not reliably reported prior to 1989
and Pell data are unavailable after the 2002–2003 academic year. Degree-granting two-year and
four-year institutions account for the majority of participants in the Pell program. For example,
in 1989, for-profit colleges and trade schools account for about 16 percent of the Pell recipients
prior to their exclusion from the sample. The 1992 reauthorization placed some limits on Pell
students matriculating at for-profit colleges and trade schools such that the proportion of Pell
recipients attending these institution types in the full universe of higher education institutions
was approximately 11 percent in 1994 (12 percent in 2002). Thus the proportion of Pell recipients
attending for-profit colleges and trade schools is small and declines slightly over the sample period.
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the actual sum of award values in a given year, such a measure may in fact
better capture the expected or intended generosity in aggregate.2
Of course, each of these generosity measures should be positively corre-
lated with Pell revenues for the average institution. However, investigating the
empirical patterns around changes in these policy instruments is of interest
because they may well be expected to yield different institutional effects. It
follows that including all three measures of generosity is important. Specifi-
cally, as a given increase in MaxPell can provide additional assistance to those
already receiving relatively large Pell awards and can also induce small awards
to those who would previously not have qualified (i.e., changing the number
of eligible students), including Eligibles allows one to measure the effect of
MaxPell holding constant the number of eligible students. Further, having the
ability to measure the effect of Eligibles while holding MaxPell and the size of
the potential student population constant may indirectly illustrate the effect
of changes to the calculation of EFC.3 Likewise, including both MaxPell and
FedApprop may allow one to separately identify the effects of changing the
upper tail of award values as measured by its maximum and changing where
in the distribution of awards the mass falls that relates to the total provision of
awards, holding the maximum constant.
Nonetheless, given the potential contribution of an institution’s COA to
the grant determination as it relates to the maximum Pell award, the tuition
responses could well be endogenous to changes in Pell generosity for low-cost
institutions. To alleviate this concern, we restrict the sample to institutions
with COA sufficiently high such that MaxPellit = MaxPellt for all years in the
sample period. In so doing, we retain over 71 percent of the larger sample of
institutions that, after discarding low-COA institutions, enroll 60 percent of all
Pell recipients.Wedonot discard these low-COA institutions, but subsequently
examine their responsiveness to changes in the generosity of federal aid in
section 4. In particular, we exploit a change in Pell funding brought about
by the 1992 HEA that exogenously affected Pell generosity for some (but not
all) of these low-COA institutions.4 Thus the analysis examines the impact of
2. Further, the sum of actual award values would be prone to simultaneity bias, whereas federal
appropriations would not.
3. With both MaxPell and FedApprop depending on congressional authorization, the determination
of FedApprop may in practice be the simple multiplying of MaxPell by the anticipated number of
eligible students. Thus the inclusion of the actual number of Eligibles introduces new information
not contained in the othermeasures, variation thatmay contribute to explaining revenue allocations.
Including a measure of the number of eligible Pell applicants in a given year may also alleviate any
concern that one’s propensity to complete a FAFSA depends on MaxPell, which would otherwise
bias the estimated effect of maximum Pell awards without its inclusion.
4. There were twomajor changes to the Pell Grant programbrought about by the 1992 reauthorization.
First, the reauthorization abolished the percentage cap onPell Grants, which provides the exogenous
variation that forms the basis of the natural experiment analyzed in section 4. Second, it removed
mortgage costs from the calculation of EFC, which was designed to protect low-income families
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Figure 1. Maximum, Average, and Minimum Pell Grant Awards over Time. Source: U.S. Department
of Education 2003–2004, table 1.
changes in the Pell program on institutions that are constrained and those that
are unconstrained by the COA rule.
The fact that such a large proportion of institutions have a sufficiently
high COA as to not affect individual Pell award values may explain the mixed
support for the Bennett hypothesis, which postulates that universities might
respond to more generous aid by raising their COA (e.g., Long 2004; Rizzo
and Ehrenberg 2004; Singell and Stone 2007). Of course, if Pell award values
for the remaining observations are actually independent of institutions’ COA,
one would not expect that the COA would rise with Pell at these institutions.
Because only Congress can change the maximum Pell Grant each year, we
exploit all variations in MaxPellt within the remaining sample as exogenous
to institutions. While there has been a significant amount of variation in the
real generosity of the Pell program over time, as demonstrated in figure 1, the
qualitative findings drawn from the analyses are not sensitive to the exclusion
of low-cost institutions as discussed subsequently.5 Summary statistics for
from appreciation of non-liquid assets that cannot readily be used to pay for college. Acosta (2001)
shows this change increased the number of students participating in the Pell program that had
higher family wealth.
5. The original intent of the Pell Grant program was to provide an award that, when combined with
other sources of aid and a reasonable family or student contribution, covered no less than 75 percent
of the student’s cost of attendance. However, while the average nominal award value has increased
from $270 when the program started in 1973 to $2,466 in 2004, the real value of the Pell Grant
has decreased. Figure 1 shows that when measured in real 2005 dollars, the maximum Pell award
peaked at roughly $6,000 shortly after the program’s introduction in 1975. However, the value of
the maximum Pell award steadily declined until 1997, when it reached a low of just over $3,000.
The 1998 HEA provided a yearly increase in the maximum Pell award through 2003, but there has
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the sample of 1,784 institutions that are never restricted by the COA rule are
provided in table 1.
In general, we anticipate that the empirical regularities revealed through
our analysis will demonstrate a revenue-increasing effect of generosity, in
general. However, theremay be different distributional effects across different
types of institutions. As this is fundamentally an empirical question, we now
define our specification.
Empirical Specification
With all three measures being exogenous to individual institutions, we regress
institution-specific Pell revenues on these Pell generosity measures and a set
of controls. Throughout the analysis, we adopt the Peterson’s Guide to Four-Year
Colleges (1990) ranking of institutions as our metric of institutional selectivity.
However, given the small cell size of the noncompetitive and minimally diffi-
cult classes of institution, we combine these into a single category. Likewise,
we combine very difficult and most difficult four-year institutions into a single
category. A distinction by selectivity is preferred to alternative classifications
such as tuition that might also be expected to restrict needy student access,
because a primary goal of U.S. federal financial aid policy is to facilitate the
match between needy students by ability. Nonetheless, selectivity and tuition
are generally correlated such that the conclusions based on broad categories
of selectivity relate to those based on broad tuition categories.
Relaxing the constraint that the set of controls influences Pell revenues
similarly across institutional selectivity, we therefore estimate the following
fixed effect specification separately for each of these selectivity categories:
log(TRit) = αi + β1 log(MaxPellt ) + β2 log(FedAppropt )
+ β3 log(Eligiblest ) + γ ′Xit + εit, (1)
where TRit is the total revenue received by institution i from all Pell grants
associated with students enrolling in year t .
Because total revenue is a simple product of Pell enrollment and indi-
vidual award values, Xit is a vector of controls that are expected to correlate
with enrollment and need. In particular, we follow prior work (e.g., Leslie
and Brinkman 1987; Heller 1997) in allowing enrollments and award values
to vary with prices, institutional characteristics, and local market conditions.
Specifically, we capture variation at the institutional level by including a mea-
sure of the direct cost of attendance (in-state tuition) and a size measure (the
not been an increase in the level of the maximum Pell award since then (Curs, Singell, andWaddell
2007).
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lag of total enrollment minus Pell enrollment), as reported in IPEDS.6 State-
level measures of financial aid generosity (state expenditures on need-based
and merit-based aid), employment opportunities (unemployment rate), de-
mographic conditions (per capita disposable income, median home values,
and mean weekly manufacturing earning), and demographics (the number of
high school graduates and the 18–19-year-old population) are also included.7
A quadratic trend is also included in this vector of controls to pick up any un-
observed time dependence. The selectivity of an institution, and other sources
of time-invariant heterogeneity, is absorbed into the error treatment through
αi .
In all specifications, we capture any time-invariant unobserved heterogene-
ity specific to institutions by including an institution-specific fixed effect. We
therefore assume that the factors that affect the decisions of Pell recipients are
captured in Xit or are time invariant. For example, unobserved preference for
one institution over another is captured through the error structure as long
as such preferences are persistent.8 The non-aid-related control variables and
the use of fixed effects follow related higher education studies that examine
similar college outcomes (e.g., Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar 2006; Singell,
Waddell, and Curs 2006). It is important to emphasize that, to the extent
Pell recipients choose a particular institution due to the institution’s generos-
ity, a concern for omitting variation across institutions in aid or generosity is
6. The fraction of students paying in-state tuition varies across institutional types. For example, 92
percent of students who attend two-year institutions are in-state as compared with 42 percent at the
most selective private schools. However, the coefficient on a control for the proportion of out-of-state
students is generally insignificant and does not affect the qualitative conclusions presented. The
tuition costs exclude actual room and board measures, which are incomplete in IPEDS for many
schools. However, the COA at institution i could be approximated by i ’s in-state tuition plus the
average statewide room and board for public or private institutions, for example. Nonetheless, the
subsequent qualitative conclusions of the analysis are not affected by alternative treatments of room
and board (e.g., including room and board in the price or by including tuition separate from room
and board), which likely results from the fact that the majority of the cross-institutional variation
in price is due to tuition. Of course, if variation in room and board is largely cross sectional, it is
absorbed into our error structure as time-invariant heterogeneity between institutions.
7. State expenditures on need-based and merit-based aid are available from the National Association
of State Student Grant and Aid Programs. Unemployment rate and mean weekly manufacturing
earning made are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Per capita disposable income is
available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Median home values are available from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census and Freddie Mac. The number of high school graduates is available from the
Southern Regional Education Board. The population of 18–19-year-olds is available from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census.
8. Of course, one potential concern in explaining institution-specific variation in Pell revenues with
few institution-specific controls that vary only over the time series dimension of the sample is
that the standard errors might be biased, possibly downward, due to aggregation. Nonetheless,
the inclusion of institutional fixed effects controls for time-invariant differences in Pell revenues
between institutions, whereas time-varying differences in Pell revenues that can be attributed to
institutional behavior are likely to be reflected (fully) in tuition and lagged enrollment. It follows that
with an abundance of state-specific controls and a few key institutional-level controls, the inclusion
of institutional fixed-effects alleviates our concern.
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mitigated by our inclusion of institutional fixed effects. That is, on this issue of
fully capturing aid availability, the only real omission from the specifiedmodel
is the potential variation in the generosity of a given institution over time.9
With our inclusion of state-level need-based and merit-based aid expenditure,
as well as quadratic time trends in the sample more generally, any remaining
omission would be anticipated to have only a minor effect on the qualitative
results.
Results
The results of estimating equation 1 are presented in table 2 for different
samples of institutions, by selectivity. Overall, the empirical relationships with
regard to the non-aid-related controls mostly confirm our prior expectations.
For example, both need- andmerit-based state aid expenditures have a positive
impact on the Pell revenue generated at noncompetitive, minimally difficult,
and moderately difficult four-year institutions and a negative impact at the
very andmost difficult institutions. Merit-aid expenditures also have a positive
impact on Pell revenues at two-year institutions, possibly due to many state
merit programs having vocational grants in addition to merit (e.g., Georgia).
As expected, total Pell revenues at an institution generally decline as income
increases in the state, suggesting that there are fewer Pell-eligible students.
Total Pell revenue increases with the number of high school graduates in the
state, potentially indicating a larger pool of potential Pell recipients. The coeffi-
cient onmean weekly manufacturing wage is significantly negative at two-year
institutions and (where significant) is positive at four-year institutions. This
may suggest that the manufacturing wage better represents the opportunity
cost of attending two-year schools. For brevity, the remainder of the discussion
focuses on the measures of Pell generosity that are of primary interest.10
In general, the estimation results demonstrate that institutional Pell rev-
enues are increasing in generosity. In particular, however, there are three
strong regularities revealed through the analysis. First, for all levels of
9. While IPEDS contains information on financial aid expenditures, unreported data in this area
are extensive. Further, there is a two-year hole where the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES) collected financial data but did not release final data files (1997 and 1998). Two-year and
for-profit schools were undergoing a change in accounting standards, which apparently produced
such a number of erroneous reports that NCES never did complete its final data production.
10. In sensitivity analyses, we interact the state-level economic controls with a measure of the scope
of the market from which the institution draws (i.e., the average proportion of in-state students
over the period). With the level effect of such a control absorbed in an institutional fixed effect,
the interactions are largely insignificant. We report the more parsimonious specification, because
both specifications yield the same qualitative conclusions and in-state student counts are missing
for fifty-seven observations. In a subsequent sensitivity test, we also included annual U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP), which also reveals the robustness of the patterns in our variables of
interest.
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selectivity, while institutional Pell revenues respond onlymoderately to federal
appropriations, changes in the maximum available Pell award are associated
with elasticity measures in excess of one in all cases.11 For example, pooled-
sample estimates (in column 5) suggest that a 10 percent increase in the max-
imum Pell award is associated with a 15 percent increase in revenues received
at the average institution in the sample. This is not the case for changes in fed-
eral appropriations, where pooled-sample point estimates suggest that federal
appropriations explain little, if any, variation in institutional Pell revenues.
Estimates from the pooled sample do suggest, however, that Pell revenues
respond significantly to the number of eligible students, with an estimated
elasticity of 0.7.
The second regularity evident in the results is the systematic nature by
which the effect of generosity differs across institutional selectivity, in terms
of both MaxPell and FedApprop. As selectivity increases among four-year in-
stitutions in our sample, point estimates suggest a monotonic decrease in the
elasticity of institutional Pell revenues with respect to changes in MaxPell.
However, the estimated sensitivity of revenues toMaxPell is lowest at two-year
institutions, where the elasticity is not statistically different from one. Inter-
estingly, the largest relative difference revealed in the elasticity point estimates
is the difference between two-year and noncompetitive or minimally difficult
four-year institutions. Holding constant the size of the applicant pool and fed-
eral appropriations for the program, this may suggest that themaximum grant
available has the strongest effect on the margin of enabling some two-year en-
rollees to access the less selective four-year institutions. Alternatively, it may
also indicate that increases in the maximum Pell award relatively benefit those
students already enrolled in less selective four-year institutions.
As selectivity increases among four-year institutions, point estimates sug-
gest a monotonic increase in the elasticity of institutional Pell revenues with
respect to changes in FedApprop. However, two-year institutions are, in fact,
the most sensitive to FedApprop. Again, the largest relative difference revealed
in the elasticity point estimates is the difference between two-year and non-
competitive or minimally difficult four-year institutions.
The third empirical regularity demonstrated in the results of table 2 is that,
holding constant the maximum Pell award and controlling for the character-
istics of the student body (e.g., the population of 18–19-year-olds, high school
11. Of course, one might expect such elasticity measures to be greater than one, since not all students
at an institution receive the maximum available Pell award. For example, if the maximum grant
is not received by all students, a given dollar increase in MaxPell necessarily amounts to a larger
proportional increase in the average Pell award than inMaxPell itself. Note that if we do not discard
institutions for whichMaxPell is endogenous to the institution’s own costs of attendance, the results
are predictably that variation in MaxPell is less associated with variation in the institution’s total
revenue collected through Pell awards. In particular, because many of the low-cost institutions are
two-year or less selective four-year institutions, this effect ismore pronounced in such specifications.
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graduating class, and family income), increases in Pell generosity measured
through changes in the number of Pell students in a given year appear to
have significant explanatory power in predicting institutional Pell revenues.
Further, the effect of Eligibles is monotonically decreasing in selectivity, with
the highest point estimate at two-year institutions (i.e., an elasticity of 1.4). To
the extent that other controls leave changes in how expected family income is
determined as the primary factor systematically contributing to the variation in
the number of eligibles, this is consistent with any such changes in generosity
being sufficiently small as to be overcome by other costs associated with a
student accessing more selective institutions.12
Before continuing, note that the above estimates afford the opportunity to
address broader policy issues surrounding proposed changes in the available
instruments of the Pell program. For example, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO; 2005, p. 2) estimates that the Education Department’s proposed
changes to the calculation of expected family contribution will reduce the
number of Pell-eligible students by 1.5 percent. Taking these estimates as given,
our analysis suggests that were such numbers to be realized in aggregate, Pell
revenue to institutions would decrease by 1.1 percent at the average school in
our sample. The asymmetries reported in our analysis, however, also suggest
that decreases may be in the order of 2.1 percent at two-year institutions
but only 0.7 percent at the most selective institutions in the country. Although
these asymmetries are of primary interest fromabroadpolicy perspective of the
Pell program’s ability to influence the distribution of needy students across the
quality spectrumof higher educational institutions, a significant redistribution
of Pell revenues may well be an important source of financial aid funds to
particular institutions. This is particularly true for public universities that
suffered significant reductions in state support and are often below capacity.
Moreover, even the most selective private universities may nonetheless care
about the composition of their student body in terms of need and whether
reduced Pell generosity might require more institutionally provided grants.
3. PELL STUDENT ENROLLMENT AND AVERAGE AWARD VALUE
As suggested earlier, any systematic relationship between institutional Pell
revenues and the generosity of the Pell program is necessarily due to the
sensitivity of enrollment of Pell students, individual award values, or some
combination of both. In the following analysis, we therefore examine the
12. Replication of the specifications in table 2 that reintroduce the low-cost institutions previously
dropped from the data does not differ significantly from those presented. As expected, the coefficient
estimates for the two-year institutions experience the largest magnitude changes from including
low-cost institutions; specifically, coefficients on MaxPell, FedApprop, and Eligibles change from
those presented (i.e., 1.050, 0.076, and 1.422, respectively) to 0.662, 0.129, and 1.425, which yield
the same qualitative conclusions as drawn from specifications that exclude the low-cost schools.
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proportional breakdown of the total revenue estimates of table 2 into these
two contributing factors. In considering the underlying factors, the sensitivity
of enrollment to changing generosity is itself recognized as nontrivial. In
fact, as the generosity of the federal Pell program changes, there are four
margins around which the number of Pell students enrolling in postsecondary
institutions may change, as well as their distribution across institutions.
First, conditional on the granting of support, increases in overall generosity
will tend to decrease the expected cost of college andmay increase overall needy
student enrollment rates. Second, as the expected value of grants increases, it
may become in the best interest of a student previously on the margin of filing
a FAFSA to now do so, increasing the number of applicants and potentially
the number of students meeting Pell’s minimum eligibility requirement.13
Third, certain marginally needy students who filed a FAFSA and who would
have been denied Pell prior to an increase in generosity may now receive a
small Pell award. Each of these margins may be expected to increase Pell
student enrollments generally and, where higher-quality education is valued,
mitigate credit constraints that might otherwise limit needy students’ choice
over higher-quality institutions.
A fourth margin, however, works against the first three. That is, given sig-
nificant cross-sectional variation in costs of attendance, increases in generosity
will change institutions’ relative prices. If prices rise with selectivity, a general
increase in the funds available to needy students may be expected to change
the distribution of needy students across selectivity, because added generosity
will tend to increase the relative price of more selective institutions. As such,
some Pell students may switch away from more expensive, more selective
four-year schools. Of course, added generosity may also enable Pell students
to switch from two-year to four-year schools, for example, with no additional
out-of-pocket costs. The overall ambiguity in predicting the direction of the
effect of generosity is therefore to be determined empirically.
The discussion of enrollment margins also implies that the sensitivity of
Pell award values to generosity is not separate from similar considerations.
In fact, it need not be the case that an increase in the maximum Pell award
increases the average award value, for such an increase in generosity implies
an enrollment response that could offset the direct effect of increasing the
maximum award. For example, an increase in MaxPell would trigger the con-
temporaneous granting of new small Pell awards to those previously on the
margin of qualifying for Pell.
13. Of course, year-to-year changes in congressional funding are hard to anticipate and occur after the
student applies for college. As such, this effect is not likely to be significant.
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Empirical Specification
Without an obvious reason for specifying correlates differently across the spec-
ification of average award values and enrollments, we propose the following
specifications:
log(PellEnrollit) = αi + βPEZit + εit (2)
and
log(ARit) = αi + βARZit + εit, (3)
where ARit is the average revenue received by institution i from all Pell grants
associated with the number of Pell students, PellEnrollit, enrolling at the insti-
tution in year t . The vector Zit captures all correlates previously included in
equation 1. Rewriting equation 1 as log(TRit) = αi + βTRZit + εit, it can easily
be shown that, given the log specification, if βˆTR is an unbiased estimate of
βTR, then βˆAR + βˆPE is also unbiased in predicting βTR. This property is also
made clear in the estimated coefficients reported in tables 3 and 4.
When considering the estimation of equations 2 and 3 separately, recall
that we have discarded all institutions with costs of attendance sufficiently
low as to have Pell eligibility or award value depend on institution-specific
costs. Thus, at the underlying disaggregated level, the award values of the
individual students, which then contribute to the observed institutional-level
average, are in fact exogenous to the particular institution in which the student
enrolls. That is, the students represented by our sample of institutions would
have received awards of equivalent value at any and all institutions in the
sample. Further, within our sample of institutions, if an individual student
was eligible to enroll as a Pell student anywhere, he or she would be eligible
everywhere.14 Therefore, in terms of our interest in separating the correlation
of generosity with total revenue into that associated with average Pell award
values and that associated with Pell enrollments, questioning the potential for
simultaneity on causal grounds is unfounded. We do note that there is some
validity to the question of, for example, omitted variables correlating cross
sectionally with ARit and PellEnrollit. With our extensive list of controls, we
believe it is instructive to consider the proportional breakdown of the revenue
sensitivities of section 2 into that derived from award values and that derived
from enrollments. In the following sections, we therefore document separately
14. Of course, in an unrestricted sample, some low-cost institutions could potentially influence the Pell
award values and therefore the number of Pell students (i.e., if their COAwas belowMaxPell, which
would imply that the Pell award would be determined by COA − EFC). Even if we did not discard
low-cost institutions from the analysis, less than one percent of all institutions had COA less than
MaxPell in 1992 (see Li 1999).
245
MONEY FOR NOTHING?
Ta
bl
e
3
.
Ef
fe
ct
of
C
ha
ng
es
in
Pe
ll
G
en
er
os
ity
on
In
st
itu
tio
na
lP
el
lE
nr
ol
lm
en
t
N
on
co
m
pe
ti
ti
ve
Ve
ry
D
iffi
cu
lt
Tw
o-
Ye
ar
or
M
in
im
al
ly
M
od
er
at
el
y
or
M
os
t
In
st
it
ut
io
ns
D
iffi
cu
lt
D
iffi
cu
lt
D
iffi
cu
lt
Fu
ll
S
am
pl
e
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
Va
ri
ab
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
Lo
g(
M
ax
Pe
ll)
0
.3
4
1
0
.8
9
4
0
.6
8
0
0
.3
0
0
0
.6
6
9
(0
.1
1
9
)∗
∗∗
(0
.1
3
5
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
6
8
)∗
∗∗
(0
.1
2
2
)∗
∗
(0
.0
5
3
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
Fe
dA
pp
ro
p)
0
.0
2
8
−0
.0
9
9
−0
.0
1
1
0
.0
3
2
−0
.0
2
2
(0
.0
3
8
)
(0
.0
4
4
)∗
∗
(0
.0
2
2
)
(0
.0
3
8
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
Lo
g(
El
ig
ib
le
s)
1
.3
9
5
0
.7
9
7
0
.5
0
2
0
.3
6
4
0
.7
1
6
(0
.0
9
5
)∗
∗∗
(0
.1
0
1
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
5
2
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
9
7
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
4
1
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
la
gg
ed
en
ro
llm
en
t
le
ss
Pe
ll
st
ud
en
ts
)
0
.1
1
7
0
.0
9
0
0
.1
5
7
0
.0
0
5
0
.1
2
4
(0
.0
1
0
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
1
1
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
1
0
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
in
-s
ta
te
tu
iti
on
)
−0
.0
3
6
0
.0
8
3
0
.0
0
4
−0
.0
5
4
−0
.0
1
4
(0
.0
1
5
)∗
∗
(0
.0
2
7
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
9
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
9
)∗
Lo
g(
st
at
e-
ba
se
d
ne
ed
ai
d
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s)
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
3
7
0
.0
3
5
−0
.0
3
0
0
.0
2
5
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
9
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
6
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
1
0
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
4
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
st
at
e-
ba
se
d
m
er
it
ai
d
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s)
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
2
5
0
.0
0
5
−0
.0
1
9
0
.0
1
3
(0
.0
1
0
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
7
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
7
)∗
∗
(0
.0
0
3
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
di
sp
os
ab
le
in
co
m
e
in
st
at
e)
−0
.3
7
8
−0
.1
1
8
−0
.3
1
6
−0
.5
2
1
−0
.3
8
8
(0
.2
0
7
)∗
(0
.2
3
0
)
(0
.1
1
5
)∗
∗∗
(0
.2
0
7
)∗
∗
(0
.0
9
0
)∗
∗∗
La
gg
ed
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
in
st
at
e
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
1
0
0
.0
0
2
−0
.0
0
2
0
.0
1
2
(0
.0
0
5
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
6
)∗
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
m
ea
n
w
ee
kl
y
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
ea
rn
in
gs
in
st
at
e)
−0
.5
6
4
0
.2
2
4
−0
.0
6
7
0
.6
6
4
−0
.0
3
2
(0
.1
4
7
)∗
∗∗
(0
.1
4
7
)
(0
.0
7
9
)
(0
.1
5
5
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
6
1
)
246 EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY
B. Curs, L. Singell, Jr., and G. Waddell
Ta
bl
e
3
.
C
on
tin
ue
d
N
on
co
m
pe
ti
ti
ve
Ve
ry
D
iffi
cu
lt
Tw
o-
Ye
ar
or
M
in
im
al
ly
M
od
er
at
el
y
or
M
os
t
In
st
it
ut
io
ns
D
iffi
cu
lt
D
iffi
cu
lt
D
iffi
cu
lt
Fu
ll
S
am
pl
e
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
Va
ri
ab
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
Lo
g(
m
ed
ia
n
ho
m
e
va
lu
e
in
st
at
e)
−0
.9
1
7
−0
.1
8
8
−0
.8
4
3
−0
.4
8
7
−0
.6
7
4
(0
.0
7
6
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
8
4
)∗
∗
(0
.0
4
2
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
7
3
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
3
3
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
nu
m
be
r
of
hi
gh
sc
ho
ol
gr
ad
ua
te
s
in
st
at
e)
0
.3
8
4
0
.2
0
9
0
.3
8
9
0
.4
3
5
0
.3
3
1
(0
.0
5
3
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
6
5
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
2
9
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
5
2
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
2
3
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
nu
m
be
r
of
1
8
–1
9
-y
ea
r-o
ld
s
in
st
at
e)
0
.0
1
6
−0
.1
2
3
−0
.4
2
9
−0
.4
3
0
−0
.2
6
3
(0
.0
8
9
)
(0
.1
0
7
)
(0
.0
5
0
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
8
4
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
3
9
)∗
∗∗
t(
1
9
8
9
=
1
)
0
.0
2
2
0
.0
4
7
0
.0
3
5
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
4
0
(0
.0
1
0
)∗
∗
(0
.0
1
1
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
6
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
1
0
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
4
)∗
∗∗
t2
−0
.0
0
1
−0
.0
0
4
−0
.0
0
2
−0
.0
0
2
−0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
0
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
1
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
0
)∗
∗∗
C
on
st
an
t
−1
2
.6
6
4
−1
2
.9
8
1
−0
.1
1
1
1
.5
0
7
−4
.1
5
3
(2
.8
8
8
)∗
∗∗
(3
.0
8
2
)∗
∗∗
(1
.6
0
2
)
(2
.9
6
2
)
(1
.2
4
4
)∗
∗∗
O
bs
er
va
tio
n/
nu
m
be
r
of
in
st
itu
tio
ns
5
,8
9
0
/5
0
3
4
,4
0
2
/3
3
9
1
1
,1
2
9
/8
1
7
1
,9
9
8
/1
4
8
2
3
,4
1
9
/1
,7
8
4
R
2
0
.2
7
0
.1
5
0
.2
3
0
.2
7
0
.1
9
N
ot
es
:I
n
al
ls
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
,t
he
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
is
Lo
g(
to
ta
li
ns
tit
ut
io
na
lP
el
le
nr
ol
lm
en
t)
.C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
es
tim
at
ed
w
hi
le
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
fo
rt
im
e-
in
va
ria
nt
un
ob
se
rv
ed
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
sp
ec
ifi
c
to
in
st
itu
tio
ns
.S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ria
bl
es
m
ea
ns
fo
rc
ol
um
ns
1
–5
ar
e
9
2
6
,6
9
9
,9
6
1
,
8
2
0
,
an
d
8
9
1
,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
∗ s
ig
ni
fic
an
t
at
1
0
%
;
∗∗
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
5
%
;
∗∗
∗ s
ig
ni
fic
an
t
at
1
%
247
MONEY FOR NOTHING?
Ta
bl
e
4
.
Ef
fe
ct
of
C
ha
ng
es
in
Pe
ll
G
en
er
os
ity
on
M
ea
n
In
st
itu
tio
na
lP
el
lA
w
ar
ds N
on
co
m
pe
ti
ti
ve
Ve
ry
D
iffi
cu
lt
Tw
o-
Ye
ar
or
M
in
im
al
ly
M
od
er
at
el
y
or
M
os
t
In
st
it
ut
io
ns
D
iffi
cu
lt
D
iffi
cu
lt
D
iffi
cu
lt
Fu
ll
S
am
pl
e
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
Va
ri
ab
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
Lo
g(
M
ax
Pe
ll)
0
.7
1
0
0
.9
3
1
0
.8
8
6
0
.8
1
9
0
.8
4
7
(0
.0
4
2
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
3
8
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
1
8
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
3
9
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
1
6
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
Fe
dA
pp
ro
p)
0
.0
4
9
−0
.0
1
5
−0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
8
(0
.0
1
3
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
Lo
g(
El
ig
ib
le
s)
0
.0
2
8
0
.0
4
7
0
.0
3
1
0
.0
7
7
0
.0
2
9
(0
.0
3
4
)
(0
.0
2
8
)∗
(0
.0
1
3
)∗
∗
(0
.0
3
1
)∗
∗
(0
.0
1
2
)∗
∗
Lo
g(
la
gg
ed
en
ro
llm
en
t
le
ss
Pe
ll
st
ud
en
ts
)
−0
.0
1
6
−0
.0
0
9
−0
.0
2
2
−0
.0
2
3
−0
.0
1
6
(0
.0
0
4
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
3
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
2
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
9
)∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
in
-s
ta
te
tu
iti
on
)
0
.0
1
5
−0
.0
1
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
0
7
(0
.0
0
5
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
3
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
st
at
e-
ba
se
d
ne
ed
ai
d
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s)
0
.0
0
3
−0
.0
0
0
−0
.0
0
0
−0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
Lo
g(
st
at
e-
ba
se
d
m
er
it
ai
d
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s)
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
−0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
5
(0
.0
0
3
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
2
)∗
(0
.0
0
1
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
di
sp
os
ab
le
in
co
m
e
in
st
at
e)
−0
.3
2
7
−0
.0
1
2
−0
.0
8
3
0
.1
2
0
−0
.1
0
3
(0
.0
7
3
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
6
4
)
(0
.0
3
0
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
6
6
)∗
(0
.0
2
7
)∗
∗∗
La
gg
ed
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
in
st
at
e
0
.0
0
6
−0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
0
2
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
m
ea
n
w
ee
kl
y
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
ea
rn
in
gs
in
st
at
e)
−0
.0
6
9
0
.0
9
9
−0
.0
5
5
−0
.0
1
5
−0
.0
2
1
(0
.0
5
2
)
(0
.0
4
1
)∗
∗
(0
.0
2
0
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
248 EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY
B. Curs, L. Singell, Jr., and G. Waddell
Ta
bl
e
4
.
C
on
tin
ue
d
N
on
co
m
pe
ti
ti
ve
Ve
ry
D
iffi
cu
lt
Tw
o-
Ye
ar
or
M
in
im
al
ly
M
od
er
at
el
y
or
M
os
t
In
st
it
ut
io
ns
D
iffi
cu
lt
D
iffi
cu
lt
D
iffi
cu
lt
Fu
ll
S
am
pl
e
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
Va
ri
ab
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
Lo
g(
m
ed
ia
n
ho
m
e
va
lu
e
in
st
at
e)
−0
.0
3
7
−0
.0
7
9
−0
.0
4
0
−0
.0
3
3
−0
.0
4
1
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
3
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
1
1
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
2
3
)
(0
.0
1
0
)∗
∗∗
Lo
g(
nu
m
be
r
of
hi
gh
sc
ho
ol
gr
ad
ua
te
s
in
st
at
e)
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
3
−0
.0
0
0
−0
.0
4
0
−0
.0
1
1
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
)∗
∗
(0
.0
0
7
)∗
Lo
g(
nu
m
be
r
of
1
8
–1
9
-y
ea
r-o
ld
s
in
st
at
e)
0
.1
1
1
−0
.0
8
3
−0
.0
3
5
−0
.0
1
9
−0
.0
1
9
(0
.0
3
1
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
3
0
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
1
3
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
t(
1
9
8
9
=
1
)
0
.0
0
8
−0
.0
0
6
−0
.0
0
6
−0
.0
0
6
−0
.0
0
4
(0
.0
0
3
)∗
∗
(0
.0
0
3
)∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
3
)∗
(0
.0
0
1
)∗
∗∗
t2
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)∗
(0
.0
0
0
)∗
∗∗
(0
.0
0
0
)∗
(0
.0
0
0
)∗
∗∗
C
on
st
an
t
2
.4
9
4
0
.7
0
6
1
.9
4
0
−0
.6
5
9
1
.7
9
9
(1
.0
2
1
)∗
∗
(0
.8
5
8
)
(0
.4
1
2
)∗
∗∗
(0
.9
4
4
)
(0
.3
7
0
)∗
∗∗
O
bs
er
va
tio
n/
nu
m
be
r
of
in
st
itu
tio
ns
5
,8
9
0
/5
0
3
4
,4
0
2
/3
3
9
1
1
,1
2
9
/8
1
7
1
,9
9
8
/1
4
8
2
3
,4
1
9
/1
,7
8
4
R
2
0
.5
4
0
.7
0
0
.8
1
0
.8
4
0
.7
1
N
ot
es
:
In
al
ls
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
,
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ria
bl
e
is
Lo
g(
m
ea
n
in
st
itu
tio
na
lP
el
lr
ev
en
ue
).
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
es
tim
at
ed
w
hi
le
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
fo
r
tim
e-
in
va
ria
nt
un
ob
se
rv
ed
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
sp
ec
ifi
c
to
in
st
itu
tio
ns
.
S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ria
bl
es
m
ea
ns
fo
r
co
lu
m
ns
1
–5
ar
e
$
1
,3
1
1
,
$
1
,5
0
9
,
$
1
,4
8
4
,
$
1
,5
2
8
,
an
d
$
1
,4
4
9
,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
∗ s
ig
ni
fic
an
t
at
1
0
%
;
∗∗
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
5
%
;
∗∗
∗ s
ig
ni
fic
an
t
at
1
%
249
MONEY FOR NOTHING?
the sensitivity of institutional-level Pell enrollments and average award values
to the time-varying measures of generosity: MaxPell, FedApprop, and Eligibles.
Results
Tables 3 and 4 report the results of estimating equations 2 and 3 on
institutional-level Pell enrollments and institutional-level mean Pell award
values. First, we note that proportionately, increases in MaxPell expand Pell
enrollments most at the less selective among four-year schools, which could
occur for two reasons. In terms of explanation, it could be that students are
beingmade newly eligible for small Pell grants in greater proportion at the less
selective four-year schools than at other institutions. Alternatively, such regu-
larity is consistent with increases in themaximum award providingmarginally
greater access to four-year schools for low-income students who might other-
wise attend two-year institutions.
Given the consideration of need in determining award values, these two
potential margins can be informed by an analysis of average award values. In
particular, consider three potential student types at a more disaggregate level
than is afforded by our data. First, for a student receiving a Pell award below
the maximum, a 1 percent increase in MaxPell would necessarily increase the
award value by more than 1 percent. Second, for a student already receiving
the maximum Pell award, a 1 percent increase in MaxPell would increase the
award value by 1 percent. Third, an increase in MaxPell may allow previously
ineligible students to qualify for small Pell awards, which would tend to yield
a coefficient less than one on MaxPell.
At the institutional level of disaggregation permitted by the data, the point
estimates across all levels of selectivity are in fact less than one. However, the
less selective four-year institutions again stand out as different from two-year
andmore selective four-year institutions, with a point estimate onMaxPell not
significantly different from one. Thus, while the results may be most consis-
tently interpreted as higher MaxPell allowing previously ineligible students to
qualify for small Pell awards, this seems most probable at two-year and the
most selective four-year institutions.
As would be expected from specifications that have captured the system-
atic patterns in overall Pell generosity, with respect to the value-based and
student-based measures of Pell generosity, institutional-level Pell enrollments
are more sensitive to the number of eligibles (table 3), and institutional-level
average award values are more sensitive to federal appropriations (table 4).
Table 5 provides a summary of the proportional breakdown of the total rev-
enue estimates of table 2 into the two underlying factors of number of Pell
students and average Pell awards, which provides the estimated strength of
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each contributing factor. In considering the general empirical patterns in this
way, the sensitivity of institutional Pell revenue due to changes in MaxPell
appears more strongly associated with average Pell awards than with enroll-
ments.While this is true across all selectivity levels, the two channels aremuch
more similar in strength at four-year institutions than they are at two-year in-
stitutions. In this regard, one may also note that the most selective institutions
(column 4) are more like two-year institutions than other less selective four-
year institutions.15 However, federal appropriations contribute largely through
enrollment at four-year institutions while working largely through average
award values at two-year institutions.
Clearly, not only are there significant asymmetries across schools of differ-
ent selectivity in their sensitivity to Pell generosity, but scrutinizing the overall
influence in this way reveals further empirical regularities that in particular
set two-year institutions apart. In short, our analysis reveals that, in addition
to changes in maximum award values and overall appropriations affecting
institutions differently according to selectivity, these effects need not even
materialize through the two channels in like fashion. As might be expected,
holding constant the population, themaximumaward value, and federal appro-
priations, increasing the generosity of the Pell programmeasured by increases
in the number of eligible Pell students is almost entirely through enrollment
effects. However, at the most selective four-year institutions, increasing the
eligible population increases total Pell revenues through increases in average
Pell awards, which also suggests that needier studentsmay have accessed these
selective schools in response to this dimension of increased generosity.
From a policy perspective, the above analysis again affords us the abil-
ity to comment on the potential outcomes of currently proposed changes to
Pell administration procedures. That is, in terms of the enrollment of needy
students in response to the 81,000 decrease in the number of Pell-eligible
students estimated by the GAO, our results point to the potential for larger
proportional decreases at two-year (2.2 percent) and less selective four-year
institutions (1.2 percent) than at the most selective four-year schools (0.4 per-
cent). Moreover, proposed changes to the maximum Pell award ranging from
$100 to $500 suggest that the enrollment of needy students would be most
15. As elite private institutionsmay be thought to have both the objective to enroll students independent
of need and the resources to do this through alleviating a particular student’s need where the Pell
program is not sufficiently generous to that student, it may be that enrollment at such schools is
less dependent on Pell generosity, as measured. Using Consortium on Financing Higher Education
(COFHE) membership as a proxy for the type of institution where such practice may be most
evident in the data, there is evidence (not reported) that from among the most selective category
of institution, total Pell revenues at institutions with COFHE membership are less responsive to
MaxPell. Further, consistent with the practice of backfilling aid, all threemeasures of Pell generosity
fail to significantly predict Pell enrollments at COFHE schools. Thus all revenue gains at these elite
institutions in response to increased Pell generosity seem to operate through award values.
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Figure 2. Relationship between Maximum Institutional Pell Grant and Costs of Attendance. Source:
U.S. Department of Education 1994–1995, table 4.
responsive at four-year institutions, with responses up to 3.2 times larger than
at two-year institutions. Thus our model suggests that these policy changes
would jointly improve the relative support provided by the Pell program at
four-year institutions.
4. THE 1992 HIGHER EDUCATION AMENDMENTS
In the previous section, we discarded the set of low-cost institutions for which
institution-specificmaximumPell awardswere determined by institutionCOA
(i.e., those with COA sufficiently low such thatMaxPellit < MaxPellt ). Specifi-
cally, this mitigated the potential endogeneity of Pell award values in the sam-
ple as institutions with sufficiently low COA may have found that increases
in MaxPell afforded them the opportunity to increase their tuition. While the
potential endogeneity of MaxPell at these institutions made this sample re-
striction appropriate in the preceding analysis, this same sample of low-cost
institutionsmay, in fact, contribute to our understanding of enrollment effects.
For example, it is this sample of institutions for which the 1993 removal of
the COA cap exogenously raised Pell aid. In this section, we therefore analyze
this set of low-cost institutions that we had initially discarded from the sample
around the exogenous removal of institution-specific Pell caps.
Figure 2 illustrates how the institution-specific Pell award, MaxPellit,
changes with the federally determined maximum, MaxPellt , before and after
the 1992 HEA. In particular, figure 2 demonstrates that, prior to 1993, max-
imum Pell grants at institutions with relatively low COA (i.e., specifically,
less than COA1) were constrained to be a maximum of 60 percent of the
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institution’s cost of attendance. With the 1992 HEA, these low-cost institu-
tions therefore experienced a one-time increase in the maximum Pell from
their institution-specific value determined by the binding percent-of-cost rule.
At institutions with higher costs of attendance (i.e., above COA1), the bind-
ing constraint on maximum Pell Grants is merely the federal maximum
(MaxPellt ). The 1992 HEA would therefore not directly affect net costs of
attending such institutions.
The previous analysis uses exogenous increases in the maximum Pell
Grant to assess whether equal absolute changes in the level of need-based aid
alter the distribution of low-income students across institutional selectivity.
Given its federally induced change in the COA rule in 1993, the HEA provides
a unique natural experiment to study whether exogenous variation in the level
of Pell aid affects the choice of students among these low-cost institutions.
In other words, whereas the previous analysis examined whether a given
increase in the Pell award affects the distribution of students across a hierarchy
of institutions, this section examines whether variation in the level of Pell
award affects the enrollment choice of students across a similar set of low-cost
institutions.
Empirical Model and Data
Following related work (e.g., Dynarksi 2004; Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar
2006), we employ a difference-in-difference strategy around the natural ex-
periment that brought about a federal change in aid policy. Specifically, the
following institutional-level fixed effect model is estimated:
log(PellEnrollit) = αi + β1(HEA1992t × Treatmenti ) + β2HEA1992t
+ γ ′Xit + εit, (4)
where HEA1992t = 1 for years after the 1992 HEA (i.e., t ≥ 1993) and
Treatmenti = 1 for those institutions with maximum Pell awards that were
restricted by the COA rule in 1992, the year prior to the rule change.
Equation 4 is estimated using the same institutional-level data set as in
earlier sections, where the sample is restricted to contain all institutions that
had maximum Pell awards that were restricted at any time between 1989
and 1992, not by the federal maximum but by the COA rule (i.e., institutions
with a cost of attendance less than COA1 in figure 2). Given the definition
of the treatment group above, the control group is all institutions that were
constrained by the cost-of-attendance rule at any time between 1989 and 1991
but were not constrained by the rule in 1992. Thus we have defined the control
group of institutions in such a way that they are the set of institutions that were
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recently constrained by the COA rule similar to the treatment group but that
had crossed the tuition-constraint threshold just prior to the 1993 rule change,
such that they did not experience an increase in their maximum allowable
Pell award with the 1993 change. We adopt the same set of controls in X as
in the previous empirical specifications. The descriptive statistics for the 357
treatment and 367 control institutions over the sample period 1989–97 are
provided in table 6.16
Empirical Results
Table 7 provides estimates of equation 4, which generally yield significant
coefficient estimates that are qualitatively similar to the prior findings with
regard to the control variables. Overall, the difference-in-difference results are
consistent with the raw difference-in-difference and confirm the prior finding
that Pell enrollments increase by a smaller amount at low-cost institutions
coincident with increasing generosity.17 However, all else equal, the removal
of the percent-of-cost rule in 1993 provides a one-time exogenous increase
in the maximum Pell awards for institutions in the treatment group, which
would be expected to raise thenumber of Pell recipients at the treated versus the
control institutions (i.e., β1 > 0). This expectation is confirmed in the results
presented in column 1 for the full sample of low-cost institutions. Specifically,
institutions that were restricted by the percent-of-cost rule in 1992 saw a 5.3
percent higher increase in the enrollment of Pell recipients after the removal
of the rule than did those institutions in the control group.18
The ability of the difference-in-difference approach to identify the exoge-
nous impact of a change in financial aid depends on whether the control and
treatment groups represent comparable institutions. In this particular case,
the higher average tuition level at four-year versus two-year institutions im-
plies that most of the institutions constrained by the percentage cost rule were
two-year institutions. Nonetheless, although the removal of the percent-of-cost
rule predominantly affects two-year institutions, 40 percent of the treatment
group is composed of four-year institutions (see table 6) while accounting for
16. Given amendments to the Higher Education Act in 1998, this sample is restricted to annual
observations before 1998.
17. The raw difference-in-difference suggests a 5.34 percent relative increase in Pell student enrollment
at treated institutions.
18. A common concern with difference-in-difference analysis is that serial correlation in the error term
may understate standard errors and increase the probability that the null hypothesis of no treatment
effect is rejected. In our particular analysis, Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) would imply
ignoring the time series component in the estimation by first calculating an average before and
after the 1992 HEA and then estimating the earlier equations on this averaged outcome variable as
a panel of length two. Results are robust to this alternative specification with the null hypothesis
of no treatment effect rejected at traditional levels. Moreover, a specification that excludes the
year of treatment in 1993 yields a difference-in-difference coefficient of 0.048, versus 0.053 in the
specification presented that included data from 1993.
255
MONEY FOR NOTHING?
Table 6. Sample Characteristics: Treatment and Control Groups
Treatment Groupa Control Group
Pre-1992 Post-1992 Pre-1992 Post-1992
Variables HEA HEA HEA HEA
Number of Pell recipients 927 1,013 1,614 1,850
(1,068) (1,171) (1,576) (1,747)
Lagged enrollment less Pell students 2,479 2,568 6,279 6,221
(3,467) (3,441) (5,897) (5,609)
In-state tuition $3,186 $3,372 $3,970 $4,317
(296) (421) (399) (464)
State-based need aid expendituresb $11 $15 $52 $68
(13) (16) (64) (83)
State-based merit aid expendituresb $7 $12 $8 $14
(9) (27) (13) (30)
Per capita disposable income in state $16,838 $17,667 $18,572 $18,982
(1,441) (1,434) (23,970) (1,902)
Unemployment rate in state 5.7 5.6 5.9 6.5
(1.5) (1.2) (1.3) (1.7)
Mean weekly manufacturing earnings $403 $404 $427 $422
in state (44) (38) (51) (47)
Median home value in state $63,434 $65,856 $90,332 $85,666
(29,480) (27,673) (42,967) (31,291)
Number of high school graduates 62,839 64,640 113,012 119,041
in state (51,005) (57,864) (99,994) (107,644)
Number of 18–19-year-olds in state 198,471 195,640 360,741 347,722
(169,557) (174,736) (327,587) (310,030)
Four-year institution 0.12 0.12 0.40 0.40
(0.33) (0.32) (0.49) (0.49)
Observations/number of institutions 1,356/357 1,742/357 1,453/367 1,826/367
Notes: Sample means are reported in the estimation procedures reported in table 7. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
aThe treatment group consists of all institutions with maximum Pell awards that were restricted by
the cost-of-attendance rule in 1992, the year prior to the Higher Education Amendments (HEA). The
control group consists of all institutions that were constrained by the cost-of-attendance rule at any
time between 1989 and 1991 but were not constrained by the rule in 1992. Thus the control group
of institutions did not experience an increase in their maximum allowable Pell award due to the
1992 rule change.
bMillions of dollars.
only 12 percent of the control group. Thus four-year institutions appear to be
overrepresented in the control group, and the difference-in-difference effect
may be identifying time-varying differences between two- and four-year insti-
tutions in addition to the exogenous increase in the maximum Pell awards.
To further examine the distinction between two- and four-year institutions,
column 2 restricts the sample to two-year institutions. The enrollment effects
associated with increases in the level of the maximum Pell award, while still
positive, are insignificant for the sample of two-year institutions. In particular,
themagnitude of the difference-in-difference coefficient declines by restricting
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Table 7. Effect of the 1992 Higher Education Amendments on Institutional Pell Enrollments
Full Sample Only Two-Year
Independent Variable (1) Institutions (2)
Post-1992 Higher Education Amendments X treatment group 0.053 0.021
(0.009)∗∗∗ (0.013)
Log(lagged enrollment less Pell students) 0.030 0.024
(0.011)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗
Log(in-state tuition) 0.018 0.017
(0.013) (0.015)
Log(state-based need aid expenditures) 0.052 0.069
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
Log(state-based merit aid expenditures) 0.060 0.054
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
Log(per capita disposable income in state) −0.365 −0.004
(0.190)∗ (0.247)
Lagged unemployment rate in state 0.032 0.025
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
Log(mean weekly manufacturing earnings in state) −0.043 −0.164
(0.145) (0.183)
Log(median home value in state) −0.856 −0.883
(0.069)∗∗∗ (0.083)∗∗∗
Log(number of high school graduates in state) 0.176 0.105
(0.038)∗∗∗ (0.049)∗∗
Log(number of 18–19-year-olds in state) −0.296 −0.351
(0.096)∗∗∗ (0.118)∗∗∗
Year fixed effect Yes Yes
Observations/number of institutions 6,377/724 4,713/539
R2 0.43 0.46
Notes: In all specifications, the dependent variable is Log(number of Pell students). Coefficients
are estimated while controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity specific to institutions.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%
the sample to two-year institutions, from 5.3 percent to 2.1 percent, which
may be an indication of needy students who enroll in two-year (i.e., more
locally oriented) institutions being less responsive to aid because they face
additional constraints that require them to attend institutions close to home.19
Alternatively, it may simply suggest that marginal price differences among
two-year institutions do not affect the choice between competing two-year
19. To check the sensitivity of the control group, the specifications in table 7 are re-run including
high-cost institutions in the control group that would be expected to be essentially unaffected
by the rule change. The difference-in-difference coefficient remains significant and increases in
magnitude from 5.3 to 11.5, reflecting the fact that the financial aid packages of students attending
these institutions are not affected by the COA rule and that these institutions likely compete for
a different set of students. Nonetheless, these results are not presented due to the concern that
including these high-COA schools in the control group for the difference-in-difference analysis
invalidates the identifying assumption that the control and treatment groups are similar in aspect
other than that influenced by the target policy.
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institutions but may well affect the choice between two-year institutions and
low-cost, four-year institutions.
Thus the results in section 3 indicate that increases in the overall generosity
of the Pell awards across all institutions may provide low-income students
access to more selective institutions, whereas the results of section 4 suggest
that low-cost institutions that experience a relative increase in the Pell award
attract more low-income students than those that do not. Jointly, the empirical
findings indicate that the college selection of low-income students responds
to both the absolute and relative magnitude of Pell awards offered by higher
education institutions.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we assess the impact of changing federal aid levels on
institutional-level Pell revenues using institutional-level data on the number
of Pell recipients and total Pell revenues from 1989 through 2002. We find
that the three levers of Pell generosity—maximum Pell award, number of
eligible students, and allocated level of federal funding—significantly affect
Pell revenues earned by universities. For example, a 10 percent increase in
the maximum Pell award is associated with a 15 percent increase in revenues
received at the average institution. Nonetheless, we find significant asymme-
tries across schools of different selectivity in their sensitivity to Pell generosity
in general and in the degree to which three different measures of generosity
relate to institutional revenues. For example, two-year institutions are found
to have a unitary revenue elasticity with respect to the maximum Pell award,
whereas the least-selective four-year institutions are found to have a revenue
elasticity of nearly two.
Scrutinizing the overall influence through separate analyses of award val-
ues and Pell enrollments reveals other important regularities in the data. For
example, we find that, in addition to changes in maximum award values and
overall federal appropriations affecting institutions differently according to se-
lectivity, these effects need not even materialize through the two channels of
Pell enrollments and average Pell awards in like fashion. For example, hold-
ing federal appropriations and the maximum potential award value constant,
the benefits afforded to two-year institutions in response to increases in the
number of eligible Pell recipients are roughly three times larger than those
afforded to the most selective four-year institutions (i.e., an enrollment elas-
ticity of 1.4 versus 0.4). On the other hand, revenues at two-year institutions
are least sensitive to variation in the maximum award value (with an average
revenue elasticity of 1.0), in particular with respect to the least selective and the
middling four-year institutions, where there is evidence of a relatively strong
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enrollment response to changes in the value of the maximum grant (with an
average revenue elasticity of 1.8 and 1.6, respectively).
The apparent variation in the response of Pell recipients across the selec-
tivity spectrum of institutions is compelling from an institutional policy stand-
point because it suggests that changes in the various margins of generosity
can have distinctly different impacts that vary with selectivity. While the avail-
able data do not permit an analysis of individual student choices with regard
to enrollment decisions, exploiting the 1992 Higher Education Amendments
to study whether differences in aid levels yield different enrollment patterns
for comparable institutions reveals that student enrollments may be directly
responsive to aid. In particular, the HEA removed the cost-of-attendance rule
and therefore raised the institution-specific maximum Pell award at some, but
not all, low-cost institutions. Around this margin, we demonstrate that the
number of Pell recipients increased at those institutions that experienced an
increase in their Pell award by over 5 percent relative to those that did not,
suggesting that low-income students may in fact substitute toward those insti-
tutions with relatively generous need-based aid. Thus, although prior evidence
suggests that Pell grants do not move students over the threshold from non-
enrollment to enrollment, low-income students appear sensitive to the level of
aid conditioned on the decision to enroll.
Overall, our results show that the Pell instrument levers the federal gov-
ernment chooses to use may affect the distribution of needy students across
institutions and the federal money that they bring with them to the institution.
In terms of our understanding recent need-related trends in postsecondary ed-
ucation and whether changes in policy instruments contribute to or mitigate
the movement of needy students toward two-year degree programs and away
from four-year schools, for example, our analysis is suggestive. For example,
our analysis suggests that increases in the maximum available Pell award or
changes to the calculation of family contributions that reduce the number of
Pell-eligible students would relatively benefit four-year institutions.
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